CHAPTER 17

WILL AND MOTIVATION

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It is a striking fact that the world of individuals is divided into those that can, and those that cannot, move themselves. The autographed baseball on my desk sits there, and will continue to do so unless someone picks it up. If it is thrown, it will move, but not under its own power. By contrast, human beings are all capable of initiating, and not merely undergoing, bodily motion. But what is it about humans that accounts for the fact that they can move themselves? One simple answer to this question is that, unlike baseballs, humans have a will, that the bodily motions that they themselves initiate are voluntary. It is also a striking fact that we often take human beings to be responsible, indeed praiseworthy and blameworthy, for their actions. Moreover, it is commonly supposed that responsibility, praise, and blame attach to free rather than to unfree actions.

What we are inclined to say about these matters raises important philosophical questions with which British philosophers of the seventeenth century struggled valiantly. Which bodily motions are voluntary, and which involuntary? Does voluntariness require deliberation in advance of action? In particular, does voluntariness attach to habitual actions, actions performed under duress, or actions done in ignorance of the relevant circumstances? Are voluntary acts caused or uncaused? If caused, are they caused by our appetites, inclinations, or judgements about what is best? Or are they caused by some special non-appetitive, non-cognitive, act of will? Supposing the latter, are acts of will themselves caused or uncaused? If they are caused, are they caused by something purely internal to the agent (such as an

appetite, judgement, or act of will), or are they caused by something external to the agent? Can actions be caused, indeed causally determined, and yet still be voluntary? If there are acts of will, does it make sense to attribute voluntariness to them? Is there such a condition as weakness of will (*akrasia*), wherein one chooses and performs a voluntary action, knowing or believing that it is worse than the alternatives? If not, why not? If so, how is *akrasia* possible?

Furthermore, are all voluntary acts free, and all free acts voluntary? Is freedom a property of an individual organism or of the organism's soul or principle of life? Does freedom come in degrees, or is it an all-or-nothing property? Supposing there are acts of will, and hence a power to will, does it make sense to think of this power as free? If so, do responsibility, praise, and blame attach to creatures with freedom of action only if these creatures also possess freedom of will? Is the causal determination of an action or act of will inconsistent with its being free?

In this chapter, I describe the answers to these questions propounded and defended by representatives of four major schools of thought on these issues: John Bramhall, Thomas Hobbes, Ralph Cudworth, and John Locke. As we will see, Locke himself changed his mind on some important matters, the second and subsequent editions of the *Essay* differing considerably from the first. (We will call the author of the nth edition 'Locke_n'.) On some important issues (such as weakness of will and compatibilism), Bramhall and Cudworth find themselves allied against Hobbes and Locke. On other important issues (such as the non-desiderative nature of the will), Locke_{2-5} and Cudworth find themselves allied against Bramhall and Hobbes. And these are not the only theoretical fault lines. The story of the development of seventeenth-century British thought on issues related to the will and motivation is both complex and fascinating.

17.1 Bramhall

In 1640, shortly before the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes fled to Paris, where he met regularly with his patron, William Cavendish, then Marquis of Newcastle. It was at Newcastle's home in 1645 that Hobbes met John Bramhall, then Bishop of Londonderry, Ireland. What most likely started as a dinner conversation on free will blossomed into a full-blown battle of books that consumed both participants until Bramhall published his *Castigations of Mr. Hobbes* in 1658.

Bramhall's views are not original, but they are representative of a particular variety of late scholastic thought on the nature of voluntariness and freedom that can be found in the works of Jacobus Arminius (a sixteenth-century Dutch protestant theologian, responsible for the Remonstrant offshoot of Calvinism)

and Luis de Molina (a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit). In order to understand Arminianism and Molinism, it is necessary to begin with late scholastic hylomorphism. According to hylomorphism, every substance (i.e. every bearer of properties) is a combination of matter and substantial form. Matter persists through change, while substantial form makes a substance the particular kind of thing it is. All human beings are substances, and hence all human beings are hylomorphic composites, a combination of matter (the human body) and substantial form (the human soul). Although the human soul is simple and unitary in not having parts, it has faculties or powers of three basic types: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective (or rational). (The first it shares with plants and animals, the second it shares with animals only, and the third is unique to it.) The soul's faculties are individuated by their characteristic activities and by their objects. So, for example, the soul's power of sight is the power to see (= activity) colour (= object). Importantly, the soul has two kinds of conative powers, irrational appetite and rational appetite. Irrational appetite is the power to desire sensible things that bring about sensible pleasure (such as food, drink, and sex). Rational appetite, which is identified with the will, is the power to desire the apparent good, where the apparent good is what the soul judges to be good. Everything that is judged to be good is either judged to be good as an end or judged to be good as a means to an end. The will, then, is the power to desire both apparently good ends and also apparently good means to apparently good ends. When the soul judges that something is good as an end or good as a means, it exercises the faculty of intellect (reason, understanding). The will, then, is the power of *rational* appetite inasmuch as it is the power to desire what the soul judges good via the exercise of reason.

Anything that has the power to do A can actualize that power by doing A. Thus, anything that has the power of sight can actualize that power by seeing (something), and anything that has a will can actualize that power by willing, that is, by desiring an apparent good. Because there are two fundamentally different kinds of apparent goods (ends and means), there are two fundamentally different kinds of willing. According to the late scholastic picture, the actualization of the power to desire something as an apparently good *end* is *simple willing*. By contrast, the actualization of the power to desire something as an apparently good *means* involves desiring something that is judged to be better than all other alternative means, and hence counts as *choosing* among alternative means. No choosing among alternatives is involved in any case of simple willing, and no desire for an end is involved in choice.

Each actualization of a power involves a double act, first of exercise, and second of specification. In the case of simple willing, there is, first, the decision to will or not to will, and, second, the decision to will this or that apparently good end. Notice here that it is important to Bramhall that the soul (even the will) have the power *not* to will, that is, the power to *suspend willing*, even when all the soul's

desires and considered judgement point in a single direction (call this 'The Doctrine of Suspension').[1] In the case of choice, there is, first, the decision to choose or not to choose, and, second, the decision to choose this or that apparently good means (to a given apparently good end). Choice is always preceded by deliberation, which is 'an enquiry made by reason, whether this or that, definitely considered, be a good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end' (EW 5: 358). By contrast, simple willing is not preceded by deliberation, for 'deliberation is of the means, not of the end' (EW 5: 393).

Among scholastics, there was a lively debate about what it is that moves (and hence determines) the will to actualization. All scholastics were agreed that the will (or, better, the soul) moves the will with respect to exercise. It is, on their view, entirely up to the soul whether it will will or not, choose or not. But there was disagreement over whether, with respect to specification, the will is moved solely and entirely by the last judgement of the understanding regarding the good (end or means): intellectualists (including Thomas Aquinas and his followers) held that it is, while voluntarists (including Arminians and Molinists, among them Bramhall) held that it is not. Interestingly, one's position in this debate determines one's position on the question of the possibility of weakness of will. For if, as the Thomists hold, the will is determined with respect to specification by the last judgement of the understanding regarding the good, then it is not possible for the soul to aim at the bad (or the worse) knowingly, and hence *akrasia* in the domain of specification is impossible. But if, as the Arminians and Molinists hold, the will is *not* determined with respect to specification by the last judgement of the understanding regarding the good (but is rather determined by *the soul*, as it is with respect to *exercise*), then it *is* possible for the soul to aim at the bad (or the worse) knowingly, and hence *akrasia* in the domain of specification is possible.

These disagreements were driven in large part by a tension at the heart of the scholastic conception of the will. On the one hand, following Aristotle, it is tempting to conceive of the will as the power of rational appetite. On the other, again following Aristotle, it is tempting to recognize the possibility of weakness of will. But these two conceptions do not sit comfortably with each other. If the will is the power of rational appetite, then it is determined to follow the greatest perceived good. But if *akrasia* is possible, then the will can choose the apparent bad (or the apparently worse), and hence is not determined to follow the greatest perceived good. Molinists and Arminians, such as Bramhall, are stuck with the tension. Thomists reduce the tension by giving up on the possibility of *akrasia*, at least in the case of specification of the power of choice. As we will see, Hobbes, Cudworth, and Locke find interestingly different ways of avoiding the tension altogether.

[1] Bramhall writes that 'notwithstanding the judgment of the understanding, the will may still suspend its own act' (EW 5: 74), and 'the will may either will or suspend its act' (EW 5: 375).

So much for the scholastic conception of the will. With regard to the relation between will and act, the scholastics provided a fourfold typology of human action, helpfully, but also somewhat misleadingly, summarized by Bramhall in the following passage:

> Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsical cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol's temple; these are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as the falling of a stone downwards; these are called natural acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, with a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called free acts. (EW 5: 84)

Bramhall here suggests that voluntary (or spontaneous) acts are those that proceed from rational desire for an end that is only imperfectly known, without choice or deliberation among alternative means for achieving the end. This is very close, but not in fact identical to, his considered view. For, as he says elsewhere (in the same section): 'I distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free [i.e. not all voluntary acts are free]' (EW 5: 81–2). Strictly speaking, then, voluntary or spontaneous actions *may*, though they need not, be chosen upon deliberation, whereas free acts *must* be chosen upon deliberation. The most important difference between free acts and merely-voluntary-but-unfree acts is that the former require more perfect, while the latter are based on less perfect, knowledge of the end.[2]

According to Bramhall, there are two main kinds of freedom or liberty, freedom to act and freedom to will. Freedom of action is a property of a human being; freedom to will is a property of the will (and so, indirectly, of the soul). A human being H is free with respect to action A if and only if H has the power to do A or not A, which of the two H chooses. Freedom of action therefore requires the ability to do otherwise. Freedom to will comes in two varieties, depending on whether it concerns simple willing (liberty of exercise) or choice (liberty of specification). A soul S is free with respect to a simple willing W (or choice C) if and only if when all things are present which are needful to produce W (or C), S can nevertheless not produce W (or C) (see EW 5: 385).

[2] On Bramhall's view, the main enemy of voluntariness (and hence of freedom) is ignorance (EW 5: 83): 'Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action. As a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord.'

As the scholastics understood 'ability', determinism (the thesis that every event proceeds from extrinsic necessary causes that necessitate it, such that it is impossible for the event not to have occurred) is logically incompatible with both freedom of action and freedom to will, for determinism makes it impossible for a human being to have done, or for a soul to have willed or chosen, otherwise. The scholastics, including Bramhall, were therefore incompatibilists. In respect of the freedom to will, all scholastics were agreed that a human soul's simple willings are determined by the will, and not by any necessary causes extrinsic to the will. On their view, then, every human being is free with respect to any act of simple willing. But, as we have seen, Thomists and Molinists/Arminians disagreed about whether *choices* are determined by the last dictate of the understanding, the former holding that they are, the latter holding that they are not. Consequently, Molinists and Arminians (such as Bramhall) affirmed, while Thomists denied, that human beings have freedom with respect to any act of choice. For Bramhall, then, human souls have both liberty of exercise and liberty of specification.[3] And given his incompatibilism, Bramhall is therefore committed to the falsity of determinism.

17.2 Hobbes

Apart from agreeing on the nature of freedom of action, Hobbes and Bramhall disagree about almost everything else relevant to issues involving the will.[4] The main reason for this is that Hobbes is a devotee of the new anti-scholastic, anti-hylomorphic mechanistic science. On this view, the explanation of natural phenomena is not based, as it is on the scholastic picture, on knowledge of substantial forms, but rather on knowledge of the size, shape, weight, hardness, and motion of material corpuscles. Indeed, Hobbes' metaphysics does away with the hylomorphic conception of substance altogether. Human beings, on Hobbes' picture, are nothing but specially organized bundles of material corpuscles. Hobbes makes room for the soul, but thinks of it as a material thing, rather than as the form of the human being. Hobbes also makes room for sensation, imagination, appetite, and reason, but conceives all of these operations of the soul as various types of corpuscular motions. Sense is 'motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.', imagination 'is but the relics of [sense]', and appetites, being the imaginings 'of *whither, which way,* and *what*', are the

[3] See EW 5: 59–60. Bramhall adds that God and the good angels have liberty of exercise without having liberty of specification, for though they can choose to will or not, their choices are determined by the good and hence 'they cannot do and not do both good and evil'.

[4] For the agreement between Hobbes and Bramhall on the nature of free agency, see EW 5: 393, 402.

'small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions' (EW 3: 38–9). Even 'reason and understanding also are acts of the imagination, that is to say, they are imaginations' (EW 5: 401; see also 5: 358).

Because appetites are 'small beginnings of motion', it makes no sense to distinguish, as Bramhall does, between rational and irrational appetites.[5] It follows that on the Hobbesian picture, the will cannot be identified either with the soul's power of rational appetite or with individual rational appetites. To understand Hobbes' conception of the will, one needs to understand his conception of deliberation. As Hobbes conceives it, deliberation is, generally speaking, 'the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come' (EW 5: 389), but more particularly, deliberation occurs 'when in the mind of man appetites, and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts' (EW 3: 47). This is a curiously passive conception of deliberation. For on Hobbes' view deliberation consists not in a kind of goal-directed mental activity (as it is on Bramhall's view), but rather in an alternating sequence of events that occur in the mind when the question arises as to which of various alternative courses of action should be taken.

The will, for Hobbes, is nothing but the power of appetite (EW 5: 93), and every act of willing (or volition) is nothing but 'the last act of our deliberation' (EW 5: 389), that is, 'the last appetite, or aversion [in deliberation], immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof' (EW 3: 48). It follows from this that Hobbes' volitions are all particular motions in the human body (indeed, in the heart; see EW 3: 2). And it also follows that there is no distinction to be made, as on Bramhall's picture, between different acts of will (simple willings and choices) or between different actualizations of the power to will (exercise and specification).

As Hobbes sees it, what moves the will is whatever is causally responsible for the last appetite in the course of deliberation. But appetites are caused by things that are external to the agent, as delicious food causes an appetite or desire for it and a ferocious animal causes an aversion to it (EW 3: 39). It follows that the will is not *determined* by the last judgement of the understanding, but is rather *constituted by* an appetite for what the soul judges best all things considered. And it is the action (rather than the will) that immediately and necessarily follows the last judgement (see EW 5: 317). This picture, unlike Bramhall's, clearly leaves no room for the possibility of *akrasia*.[6] Thus Hobbes avoids the tension between the proposition

[5] Hobbes writes (EW 5: 288–9): 'There is nothing rational but God, angels, and men.'

[6] In defense of the possibility of *akrasia*, Bramhall quotes Medea's famous speech from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: *Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor* [I see and I desire the better, but I follow the worse]—see EW 5: 315. Medea is referring to her irresistible love for Jason, leader of the Argonauts, and a stranger to her father's kingdom. Medea recognizes that it would be better for her not to marry a stranger, and yet, overpowered by her love for him, decides to marry Jason anyway. Hobbes

that the will is the power of rational appetite and the proposition that *akrasia* is possible by simply denying both propositions.

Hobbes' official conception of voluntary action differs significantly from Bramhall's. According to Bramhall, voluntary (or spontaneous) acts are those that proceed from rational desire for an end that is only imperfectly known; and though all free acts are necessarily chosen upon deliberation, voluntary acts need not be deliberated upon before being performed. Hobbes, at least initially, disagrees, for he writes that 'voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of' (EW 5: 79). In this, Hobbes writes, voluntariness is to be distinguished from spontaneity, which is properly defined as 'inconsiderate proceeding' (EW 5: 389). However, Hobbes also characterizes voluntary actions as 'those actions that follow immediately the last appetite', even those 'where there is only one appetite' (EW 5: 345). This definition is prompted by examples of voluntary action that are not preceded by any deliberation, either because there is no time for it—as when 'in sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape' (EW 5: 344)—or because, even though there is time for it, 'never anything appeared that could make [one] doubt of the consequence' (EW 5: 344–5)—as in the case of habitual actions, such as eating and walking, that are 'done without fore thought' (EW 5: 81).

Upbraided by Bramhall for having provided mutually inconsistent definitions of voluntariness (EW 5: 82, 346), Hobbes eventually abandons the official definition.[7] Hobbes writes that '*voluntary* presupposeth *deliberation*, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge', and more particularly, that 'the action of a man that is not a child, in public judgment how rash, inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is to be taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the law; when, nevertheless, that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary' (EW 5: 94). Hobbes' point is that although some voluntary actions (such as rash acts) were *not* chosen upon deliberation, a judge of those acts will, for purposes of the administration of justice, *suppose* that they were, on the grounds that the agent 'ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate whether the action were lawful or not' (EW 5: 350). Hobbes' understanding of voluntariness is therefore closer to Bramhall's than he would like to admit, for both

replies to the example as follows: 'the saying, as pretty as it is, is not true. For though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all; and thereupon the wicked action followed necessarily' (EW 5: 317). Interestingly, Hobbes does not tackle the case of Medea's decision to marry Jason, but rather her later far more calculated and cold-blooded decision to kill the children she had borne him in order to get back at him for having spurned her.

[7] For a different reading of Hobbes' position on whether voluntariness presupposes deliberation, see Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998: 1219.

philosophers make room for the possibility of indeliberate voluntariness. The main difference between them on this issue does not lie here, but rather lies on the epistemic front. For Hobbes affirms, while Bramhall denies, that voluntariness is compatible with ignorance of relevant features of the situation.

For Bramhall, a free human agent is one who has both freedom of action and freedom to will, both liberty of exercise and liberty of specification. As Hobbes sees it, there is and can be no more to freedom than freedom of action: 'It cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he will . . . He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at all' (EW 5: 249–50). Hobbes' position is that the soul has no freedom to will, a thesis that follows directly from his conception of volition. For the Hobbesian will is nothing but the power of appetite, and every volition is no more than the last appetite in the course of deliberation. So, as Hobbes sees it, freedom to will would have to consist in freedom to desire, which would itself have to consist in the ability to desire what one chooses to desire and the ability to forbear desiring what one chooses not to desire. But, Hobbes holds, it is nonsense to suppose that anyone should have these sorts of abilities. Human beings do not and cannot choose to desire, or not to desire, this or that.[8] It follows, despite Bramhall's insistence to the contrary, that human beings do not have the power to suspend willing, i.e. that the Doctrine of Suspension is false; for '*the will*, and *the willing*, and *the appetite* is the same thing' (EW 5: 295).[9] Indeed, Hobbes ridicules the very concepts of liberty of exercise and liberty of specification, calling the phrases that are supposed to express them but 'jargon, or that . . . which the Scripture in the first chaos calleth *Tohu* and *Bohu* [that is, confusion and emptiness]' (EW 5: 63, 20).

But in what, according to Hobbes, does freedom of action consist? Hobbes' pronouncements on the issue, at least initially, appear to be mutually inconsistent. In some places, Hobbes characterizes freedom of action as involving a dual conditional ability. On this view, a human being H is free with respect to action A when and only when (i) H has the ability to do A if H wills to do A and (ii) H has the ability to forbear doing A if H wills to forbear doing A. For example, Hobbes writes that 'he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear' (EW 5: 38), and that 'a *free agent*, is he that can

[8] Hobbes writes (EW 5: 34): 'No man can determine his own will, for the will is appetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite, that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when not. When a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not to eat; this is the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not hungry . . . is not in his choice'. See also EW 5: 174–5: 'It is a truth manifest to all men, that it is not in a man's power to-day, to choose what will he shall have to-morrow, or an hour, or any time after'.

[9] Hobbes also denies Bramhall's claim that a human being has the power to suspend (or refuse) what he wills, insisting on its absurdity: 'To refuse what one willeth, implieth a contradiction' (EW 5: 295).

do if he will and forbear if he will' (underlining added; EW 5: 389, 450).[10] In other places, Hobbes offers what appear to be completely different accounts of freedom of action. First, Hobbes writes that to say that one is free is 'to say he hath not made an end of deliberating' (EW 5: 363). Second, Hobbes says that '[l]iberty is the absence of all the impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature, and in the intrinsical quality of the agent' (EW 5: 367), that 'a *free man* is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to' (EW 3: 196–7).

Does Hobbes mean these various formulations of freedom of action to be mutually equivalent? I believe so. First, it is reasonable to suppose that by 'X has the ability to [i.e. can] do A if X wills to do A', Hobbes means no more than 'there are no external impediments to X's doing A'. For it is reasonable to suppose that by 'X can do A', Hobbes means no more than 'there is nothing external to X to prevent X's doing A'; and Hobbes defines 'impediment or hinderance' as 'an opposition to endeavour' (EW 5: 352), and defines 'endeavour' as the genus of desire and aversion (EW 3: 39). So, as he sees it, to say that there are no external impediments to X's doing A is to say that there is nothing external to X to prevent X from carrying out his endeavour (i.e. his will) to do A. Second, Hobbes makes clear that if there are external impediments to X's doing A, then X has finished deliberating (for 'there are no impediments but to the action, whilst we are endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have done deliberating'; EW 5: 366–7), and hence that if X has not finished deliberating, then there are no external impediments to X's doing A, and hence X is free with respect to A.[11]

Given his conception of freedom as freedom of action, it is unsurprising that Hobbes (unlike Bramhall) is a compatibilist. As Hobbes sees it, it is possible for human actions to be causally determined (indeed, necessitated), even as humans are free to do as they will, for freedom is no more than the ability to do, and to forbear doing, as one wills. Indeed, Hobbes holds the radical position that this situation is not only *possible*, but also *actual*. For Hobbes believes that there are a priori reasons to accept determinism: first, that God (whose existence can be known a priori, and whose perfection guarantees his omniscience) foreknows all propositions about the future, and what God foreknows must come to pass (EW 5: 428–9); second, that 'whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it', that 'a sufficient cause [is] a necessary cause', and hence that everything

[10] Notice Hobbes' use of 'and', which I have underlined in the text. Chappell 1999: xviii says that Hobbes' position is better expressed with 'or' rather than 'and'. Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998: 1224 claim that Hobbes' position is correctly expressed as follows: '*m* is free with respect to *d* . . . if and only if *m* both wills to do *d* and is able to do *d*'. My own view is that neither of these restatements is accurate to the relevant texts (see below).

[11] Admittedly, the converse is arguably false, that is, it is arguably false that if X has finished deliberating, then there are no external impediments to X's doing A. But Hobbes does not acknowledge this as a problem, and it is reasonable to suppose that he is simply oblivious to it.

that happens happens necessarily (EW 5: 380); and third, that it is necessary that *p or not-p*, and hence either it is necessary that *p* or it is necessary that *not-p* (EW 5: 406).[12]

17.3 Cudworth

Ralph Cudworth was the most influential proponent of a view that has come to be known as Cambridge Platonism. The moniker derives from the fact that Cudworth (along with his like-minded friend, Henry More) spent his entire professional adult life at the University of Cambridge, defending doctrines of a broadly Platonic character. On the subject of will and motivation, Cudworth's Platonic sympathies provide him with a unique perspective on the matters debated by Bramhall and Hobbes, a perspective that almost certainly influenced the revisions to the *Essay* that Locke undertook towards the end of his life while a guest of Cudworth's daughter and accomplished philosopher in her own right, Damaris Masham.

Like Hobbes, Cudworth was unremittingly hostile to the scholastic conception of the human mind and its powers. But Cudworth's hostility did not derive from any sort of allegiance to mechanistic science, but rather from sympathy with Plato's tripartite conception of the soul. In the *Republic*, Plato (through his mouthpiece, Socrates) claims that the soul has three parts: Reason (the calculating part that considers consequences and aims at the best, whose function is to rule the whole soul), Spirit (the part responsible for anger, whose function is to assist reason in performing its function), and Appetite (the part responsible for desire, whose function is to seek pleasure). One of Plato's reasons for thinking that Reason differs from Appetite is that Reason can lead the soul to shun what Appetite leads the soul to embrace. Indeed, in a well-ordered soul, Reason rules and, with the help of Spirit, resists Appetite's attempts to fulfil its desires.

In Cudworth's system, the function of reason is taken over by the soul's hegemonic (*to hegemonikon*), which he identifies with the soul's 'power over itself, its exerting itself with more or less force and vigour in resisting [the] lower affections, or hindering the gratification of them' (EIM XI: 182). Although the hegemonic is responsible for the soul's volitions, Cudworth does not think of it as a kind of blind faculty of will, 'utterly devoid of all light, and perception, or understanding' (EIM IX: 177). Like Plato's reason, the hegemonic is capable of acquiring knowledge of the good and directing the soul to pursue it. Cudworth therefore differs from

[12] Hobbes' third a priori argument for determinism is obviously sophistical, as Bramhall well recognizes (EW 5: 413–14).

Bramhall and other scholastics in refusing to think of the will as rational desire, and differs from Hobbes in refusing to think of the will as the faculty of desire *simpliciter*: as he sees it, the hegemonic is not a desiderative faculty at all.

Like Bramhall, Cudworth allows for the possibility of weakness of will. As he says: 'a man's soul as hegemonical over itself . . . may, upon slight considerations and immature deliberations . . . choose and prefer that which is really worse before the better' (EIM X: 178–9). But whereas Bramhall's acceptance of weakness of will does not sit well with his identification of the will with the power of rational desire (see above), Cudworth's non-desiderative conception of the hegemonic enables him to avoid this tension altogether.

Given his acceptance of the possibility of weak-willed action, Cudworth is unsurprisingly hostile to scholastic intellectualism. For if, as intellectualists hold, the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding, and if the understanding, as Cudworth admits, is judge of apparent goodness and badness, then *akrasia* would be impossible. But Cudworth's hostility to intellectualism stems also from his resistance to determinism, the truth of which, on his view, would unacceptably rob all praise, blame, repentance, and punishment of any justification (EIM: 1).[13]

But if the understanding does not move the hegemonic, what does? Cudworth's answer is that the hegemonic is special in having the ability to move itself. In support of this claim, Cudworth offers the following argument. First, the hegemonic (and hence the soul whose ruling principle it is) is self-conscious, in that it can 'intend and exert itself' (EIM XIII: 185). And second, whatever is self-conscious is capable of self-motion: 'That which is thus conscious of itself, and reflexive upon itself, may also as well act upon itself, either as fortuitously determining its own activity or else as intending and exerting itself more or less in order to the promoting of its own good' (EIM XIX: 201). Against Hobbes' objections that (i) nothing is capable of moving itself and (ii) nothing can be both agent and patient (with respect to itself), Cudworth insists that Hobbes mistakenly applies 'that to all being whatsoever, which is the property of body only' (EIM XVIII: 199). For, Cudworth insists, the existence of corporeal motion requires the existence of an unmoved, self-moving mover, and hence is proof that self-motion is not only possible, but actual.[14]

Apart from exercising the Platonic function of resisting the lower affections, Cudworth's hegemonic also works to engage in and stop speculation and deliberation. This fact is one of which we have empirical knowledge, presumably by introspection:

[13] Cudworth writes (EIM VI: 169): 'if the blind will do alway[s] necessarily follow a necessary dictate of the understanding antecedent, then must all volitions and actions needs be necessary'.

[14] Cudworth writes (EIM XVIII: 199): 'if there be motion in the corporeal world, as there is, and no part of it could ever move itself, then must there of necessity be some unmoved or self-moving thing as the first cause thereof, something which could move or act from itself without being moved or acted upon by another. Because if nothing at all could move or act by itself, but only as it was moved or acted upon by another then could not motion or action ever begin, or ever have come into the world'.

> we know, by certain experience, that speculation or deliberation about particular things is determined by ourselves both as to objects and exercise; we can call it off from one thing, and employ it or set it a work upon another, and we can surcease, suspend, and stop the exercise of it (when we please) too, diverting ourselves into action. (EIM IX: 178)

Thus, Cudworth agrees with Bramhall, as against Hobbes, that the Doctrine of Suspension is true. Even if it has decided to act, the soul has the ability to keep itself from acting in order to engage in further deliberation; and then the soul can, whenever it pleases, halt any further deliberation and act in accordance with what appears to be the best. Indeed, Cudworth emphasizes the fact that the very point and function of the hegemonic's power of suspension is to achieve the good.[15]

It is the hegemonic's power of 'intending or exerting itself more or less in consideration and deliberation, in resisting the lower appetites that oppose it . . . in self-recollection and attention, and vigilant circumspection, or standing upon our guard' (EIM X: 178) that Cudworth identifies with what he calls the '*liberum arbitrium* or freewill' (EIM XIV: 185). Like the incompatibilist Bramhall, and unlike the compatibilist Hobbes, Cudworth insists that true freedom involves 'freedom from necessity' (EIM XIII: 185), that such freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, and that the ability to do otherwise requires the power of self-determination that uniquely belongs to the soul's hegemonic. In addition to freedom of action, then, true freedom requires the freedom to will, to engage in and stop speculation and deliberation, as one pleases.

Cudworth's contribution to the debate about freedom and necessity thus consists in his attempt to frame a point of view that cuts across the lines of disagreement that separate Bramhall from Hobbes. On the one hand, like Hobbes, Cudworth jettisons Bramhall's scholastic assumptions, including the conception of the soul as unitary, as well as the conception of the will as rational desire. On the other hand, as against Hobbes, Cudworth embraces Bramhall's incompatibilism and his insistence that there is such a thing as free will (or freedom of will) distinct from freedom of action.

The main question for Cudworth, of course, is whether there is such a thing as the soul's hegemonic as he conceives of it. Part of Cudworth's hostility to the scholastic theory of mind derives from a Hobbesian disdain for treating the powers of the mind as homuncular agents. Echoing Hobbes' criticisms of Bramhall, Cudworth famously opines:

> But this scholastic philosophy is manifestly absurd, and mere scholastic jargon. For to attribute the act of intellection and perception to the faculty of understanding, and acts of

[15] Cudworth writes (EIM XIII: 185): 'This faculty of . . . power over ourselves, which belongs to the hegemonicon of the soul . . . is intended by God and nature for good, as a self-promoting, self-improving power, in good, and also a self-conserving power in the same, whereby men [receive] praise of God, and their persons being justified and sins pardoned through the merits and true propitiatory sacrifice, have a reward graciously bestowed on them by God, even a crown of life'.

volition to the faculty of will, or to say that it is the understanding that understandeth, and the will that willeth—this is all one as if one should say that the faculty of walking walketh, and the faculty of speaking speaketh, or that the musical faculty playeth a lesson upon the lute, or sings this or that tune . . . all this while it is really the man or soul that understands, and the man or soul that wills, as it is the man that walks and the man that speaks or talks, and the musician that plays a lesson on the lute. So that it is one and the same subsistent thing, one and the same soul that both understandeth and willeth, and the same agent only that acteth diversely. (EIM VII: 170–1)

In some places Cudworth is careful to suggest, consistently with this approach, that the hegemonic is nothing more than a power that the soul possesses.[16] But in other places, Cudworth treats the hegemonic as an agent within the soul that possesses this power.[17] And in yet other places Cudworth writes as if the hegemonic is the entire soul, considered in a certain way, namely as possessing this power.[18]

Cudworth's problem is that he is frankly pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, he cannot accept the scholastic hypostatization of the will. On the other hand, his Platonic conception of the soul encourages his treatment of the hegemonic (a counterpart of Plato's Reason) as an agent endowed with powers of its own. And this Platonic conception is reinforced by separate considerations related to the need to explain the soul's essential unity. As Cudworth sees it, the soul would be incapable of motion and action if it did not have a guiding principle controlling its various appetites and affections. Thus, for example, Cudworth writes:

I say there being so many wheels in this machine of our souls, unless they be all aptly knit and put together, so as to conspire into one, and unless there be some one thing presiding over them, intending itself more or less, directing, and ordering, and giving the fiat for action, it could not go forwards in motion, but there must be a confusion and distraction in it, and we must needs be perpetually in puzzle.[19] (EIM XVI: 194)

[16] For example, Cudworth writes of 'the soul's hegemonic or power over itself' (EIM XI: 182).

[17] For example, Cudworth writes of a 'power over ourselves, which belongs to the hegemonicon of the soul' (EIM XIII: 185), and insists that 'there is in us some one hegemonical, which comprehending all the other powers, energies, and capacities of our soul . . . having a power of intending and exerting itself more or less, determineth, not only actions, but also the whole passive capability of our nature one way or other' (EIM XVI: 193).

[18] For example, in the chapter of the *Treatise on Free Will* in which he explicitly addresses the question of the nature and identity of the hegemonic, Cudworth writes (X. 178): 'I say, therefore, that the [hegemonicon] in every man . . . is the soul as comprehending itself, all its concerns and interests, its abilities and capacities, and holding itself, as it were in its own hand, as it were redoubled upon itself, having a power of intending or exerting itself more or less in consideration and deliberation, in resisting the lower appetites that oppose it', and so on.

[19] There is also this passage (EIM XVI: 195): 'God Almighty could not make such a rational creature as this is, all whose joints, springs, and wheels of motion were necessarily tied together, which had no self-power, no hegemonic or ruling principle, nothing to knit and [unite] the multifarious parts of the machine into one, to steer and manage the conduct of itself'.

There is therefore a fundamental and ineradicable tension at the heart of Cudworth's conception of the soul. And this tension makes it impossible for him to provide a fully satisfactory philosophical solution to the problem of free will.

17.4 Locke

Locke ventured into the philosophical minefield of will, motivation, and freedom in Chapter 21 ('Of Power') of the first edition of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Under pressure of philosophical criticism from friends, including William Molyneux and Philipp van Limborch, Locke revised this Chapter of the *Essay* several times, most notably in the second edition (1694), fourth edition (1700), and fifth edition (1706). In the second edition, Locke gave up important theses of the first edition, a change that necessitated the complete rewriting of sections 28ff. For ease of reference, I am going to refer to the author of the first edition of the *Essay* as 'Locke$_1$', to the author of the second edition of the *Essay* as 'Locke$_2$', and so on. Where there is agreement across all five editions, I will refer to the author of the *Essay* as 'Locke'.

Like Bramhall and Hobbes, Locke conceives of the will as a power or faculty of mind. And like Hobbes, Locke has no patience for Bramhall's hypostatization of the will:

[The scholastic] way of Speaking of *Faculties*, has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in Questions relating to them. (*Essay* II. xxi. 6: 237)

But Locke's view about the nature of the will changed between the first and second editions of the *Essay*. According to Locke$_1$, the will is a '*Power* the Mind has to prefer the consideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance' (*Essay* II. xxi. 5: 236). Locke$_1$ therefore thinks of the will as a faculty of preferring or desiring mental operations and corporeal actions. Correspondingly, Locke$_1$ thinks of acts of will, namely volitions, as particular preferences or desires (*Essay* II. xxi. 28: 248). In this, Locke$_1$'s views recapitulate Hobbes'.[20] Indeed, like

[20] The fact that Locke$_1$ and Hobbes agree on the nature of the will does not entail that they agree on the nature of desire. In keeping with his corpuscularian mechanism, Hobbes identifies individual desires or appetites with small beginnings of motion in the body. It is unclear whether Locke$_1$ follows Hobbes in this. For Locke$_1$, who is far less dogmatic and more wedded to the experimental method

Hobbes, and largely for the same reasons, $Locke_1$'s conception of the will leads him to deny the possibility of *akrasia*: preference or desire always being directed at the good (or the apparent good), it is impossible for the mind to knowingly will (and hence do) something bad. On this view, '*Good* then, *the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 29: 251).

But by 1694, $Locke_2$ has come to recognize that experience speaks strongly in favour of weakness of will. Thus, 'let a Drunkard see, that his Health decays, his Estate wastes . . . yet . . . the habitual thirst after his Cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern' (*Essay* II. xxi. 35: 253). And indeed, like Bramhall and Cudworth, and against Hobbes, $Locke_2$ recognizes the truth of Ovid's dictum: *Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor* (I see and I desire the better, but I follow the worse; see footnote 6) (*Essay* II. xxi. 35: 254). And this recognition drives $Locke_2$'s abandonment of $Locke_1$'s identification of the will with the faculty of desire. What $Locke_2$ sees is that '*Desire* . . . in the very same Action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our *Wills* sets us upon' (*Essay* II. xxi. 30: 250). Thus, '[a] Man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him' (*Essay* II. xxi. 30: 250). And the fact that 'the *Will* and *Desire* run counter' with respect to the same action at the same time establishes 'that *desiring* and *willing* are two distinct Acts of the mind' (*Essay* II. xxi. 30: 250). Instead, $Locke_2$ identifies the will with the '*Power* which the mind has, thus to order the consideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance' (*Essay* II. xxi. 5: 236). The will, then, as $Locke_2$ conceives it, is a power to *command* (rather than to *desire*) mental operations and bodily motions (and hence volitions are individual mental commands (*Essay* II. xxi. 28: 248)).[21] $Locke_2$'s conception of the will therefore resembles Cudworth's conception of the hegemonic in being wholly non-desiderative. But, unlike Cudworth, Locke is very careful to avoid hypostatization of the will.

$Locke_1$'s conception of voluntary action closely resembles Hobbes'. On Hobbes' view, an action is voluntary when it follows immediately the last appetite, which appetite Hobbes calls the agent's volition (or act of will). Similarly, $Locke_1$ holds

than Hobbes, thinks of corpuscularian mechanism as the best available scientific hypothesis of his time, one that might well be superseded by better hypotheses that account for the anomalies (such as electricity, magnetism, gravity, and cohesion) that plagued the mechanism of his day. For more on Locke's relation to mechanism, see Downing 1998.

[21] As the quotation from *Essay* II. xxi. 5 indicates, $Locke_2$'s revisions of the first edition of the *Essay* are not thoroughgoing. In the second and subsequent editions of the *Essay*, there remain passages in which Locke appears to identify the will with the power of preferring or desiring, rather than with the power to issue mental orders. Interestingly, $Locke_2$ recognizes this, acknowledging that he has 'endeavoured to express the Act of *Volition*, by *chusing*, *preferring*, and the like Terms, that signify *Desire* as well as *Volition*, for want of other words to mark that Act of the mind, whose proper Name is *Willing* or *Volition*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 30: 249).

that voluntary action is action that is consequent to the agent's preference, even 'the sitting still . . . of a Paralytick, whilst he preferrs it to removal' (*Essay* II. xxi. 11: 239). But $Locke_2$'s understanding of voluntary action changes in keeping with his new theory of the nature of the will. For $Locke_2$, an action is voluntary only when its forbearance or performance is 'consequent to [an] order or command of the mind' (*Essay* II. xxi. 5: 236).[22]

Locke's debt to Hobbes extends to his conception of freedom. Like Hobbes, Locke holds that there is no more to freedom than freedom of action, that is, the ability to do or forbear as one wills: 'so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference [second edition: or direction] of his own mind, so far is a Man *Free*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 8: 237).[23] Locke realizes, as Hobbes does not, that voluntary actions can be unfree. In several places, Hobbes insists that 'free and voluntary are the same thing' (EW 5: 226), that 'all voluntary acts [are] free, and all free acts . . . voluntary' (EW 5: 365). Locke disagrees, partly on the strength of hypothetical scenarios of the following sort (*Essay* II. xxi. 10: 238):

> suppose a Man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in, *i.e.* preferrs his stay to going away. I ask, Is not this stay voluntary? I think, no Body will doubt it: and yet being locked fast in, 'tis evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone.[24]

The point of the example, of course, is that it is possible to perform an action voluntarily, even as one is not free to forbear performing it.[25]

Locke considers the question whether it is appropriate to attribute freedom to the will, as Bramhall does. But, like Hobbes, Locke finds the question 'unreasonable, because unintelligible', for '*Liberty*, which is but a power, belongs only to

[22] It is not clear what Locke builds into the notion of 'consequence' here. Is the mere fact that act A is (immediately) temporally posterior to the volition to A sufficient for A to count as voluntary? Locke does not say, but we may presume on his behalf that he would answer this question in the negative. For it is easy to imagine situations in which X wills to do A but then later does A by accident or under compulsion. In order to count as voluntary, the doing of A must clearly be *caused* by a prior volition to A. But this brings up another question: Is the mere fact that act A is caused by the volition to A sufficient for A to count as voluntary? Again, Locke does not say. But we may presume on his behalf that he would answer *this* question positively. Here I agree with Lowe 1986, 2005 and Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998, and disagree with Yaffe 2000.

[23] Yaffe 2000 argues that $Locke_2$'s conception of freedom extends beyond freedom of action in requiring the power to bring it about that one's volitions are determined by the good. For criticisms of Yaffe's non-Hobbesian account of Locke's conception of free agency, see Rickless 2001.

[24] This example may have been inspired by a similar example of Bramhall's, one involving a man deliberating 'whether he shall play at tennis [while] at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked against him' (EW 5: 346).

[25] Locke's example of the 'Paralytick' at *Essay* II. xxi. 11, mentioned above, serves the same purpose.

Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the *Will*, which is also but a Power' (*Essay* II. xxi. 14: 240). The fundamental problem, as Locke sees it, is that it is metaphysically impossible for powers to be endowed with powers. Powers are, as the scholastics would put it, modifications of substance, ways for a substance to be. As such, they cannot themselves be modified.

But the fact that the will cannot itself be free does not entail that humans are not free to will. Locke acknowledges the existence of two kinds of actions: mental and corporeal. Willing, as much as considering, combining, comparing, and abstracting ideas, is a mental action. So if human beings are free to perform *corporeal* actions (such as walking across the room or sitting still), aren't they also, at least in principle, free to perform *mental* actions (including willing) as well? Locke_1 considers this question, and, unlike any of his predecessors, divides it in two. There is, first, the question whether a human being is free '*in respect of willing any Action in his power once proposed to his Thoughts*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 23: 245). And second, there is the question '[*w*]*hether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 25: 247).

There is significant scholarly controversy regarding how to understand Locke's answers to these questions. The standard view is that Locke_1 answers both questions *negatively*, but that changes made to the fifth edition of the *Essay* indicate that Locke_5's negative answers are no longer consistent with other aspects of his theory of volition. Concerning the first question, my own view is that Locke_1 answers it negatively, but that Locke_5 recognizes that the negative answer must be *qualified* in a way that remains consistent with the rest of his volitional theory; and concerning the second question, my view is that Locke_1 and Locke_5 both answer it *positively*, in a way that does not introduce inconsistency into their philosophical views as a whole.

The first question is whether humans are free to will or not to will with respect to action A, once the issue of whether to do A is proposed to them. To this question, Locke_1 appears to answer 'No'. The reasoning is simple (see *Essay* II. xxi. 23: 245–6).[26] Let H be a human being who is considering whether to do action A. (1) Either A exists or A does not exist; (2) If A exists, it is only because H wills it to exist; (3) If A does not exist, it is only because H wills it *not* to exist. So, whether A exists or not, H must will (either that A exist or that A not exist). Therefore, with respect to any action once proposed to H's thoughts, H cannot avoid willing, and hence is not free in respect of the act of willing. (Following Chappell 1994: 107, call this conclusion the Unavoidability Thesis.)

In his *New Essays* Leibniz famously reacts to this argument by denying premise (3). As he argues, it is possible for human beings to suspend willing one way or the other with respect to a particular action, and in such cases the non-existence of

[26] For a very helpful and more detailed rendition of the reasoning, see Chappell 1994.

the action might well come about despite the absence of a prior volition to perform it (see Leibniz 1996: 181–2). Some scholars (e.g. Chappell 1994: 106–7) see this as a damning criticism, especially in light of the fact that Locke_{2-5} themselves accept the Doctrine of Suspension (see *Essay* II. xxi. 47: 263; *Essay* II. xxi. 56: 270–1).

But in the end the criticism does not stick. Locke_2, and later Locke_5, make it absolutely clear that the argument at *Essay* II. xxi. 23–4 establishes only a *restricted version of the Unavoidability Thesis*. Locke's point is *not* that it is with respect to willing *any* action that one is not free, but rather that it is with respect to willing *stoppings of processes in which one is currently engaged* that one is not free. Already in the first edition, Locke illustrates the Unavoidability Thesis by means of the following example:

> [A] Man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he *will* will, or no: He must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them; walking or not walking. (*Essay* II. xxi. 24: 246)

Here it is clear that Locke is not thinking of an action that is to be performed at a later time, but rather one that is to be performed at the time it is being considered; and it is also clear that Locke is not thinking of *any* sort of action, but rather of an action *that consists in continuing or ending an already existing process*. This is something Locke_5 *emphasizes*. In the first edition, the passage continues:

> [A]nd so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power; they being once proposed, the Mind has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty: It has not a power to forbear *willing*. (*Essay* II. xxi. 24: 246)

But in the fifth edition, the passage continues (with the additions underlined):

> [A]nd so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary Actions, that succeed one another every moment that we are awake, in the course of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the *Will*, 'till the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have shewn, the Mind in respect of *willing* has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty: The Mind in that case has not a power to forbear *willing*.

What these additions make clear is that Locke_5 does not accept the Unavoidability Thesis *in all generality*, but only accepts the version of the thesis that is restricted to those actions that are not 'proposed to the *Will*, 'till the time they are to be done', namely stoppings of processes in which one is currently engaged.

Importantly, when (3) is suitably restricted to this particular subset of the set of all actions, Leibniz's objection no longer applies, and (3) seems incontrovertible. The restricted version of (3) states that *where A is the stopping of a process in which H is currently engaged*, if A does not exist, it is only because H wills it *not* to exist. This seems right: if the walking man considers whether to stop walking and indeed does stop walking, this is only because he *wills* not to continue walking. But if

the suitably restricted version of (3) is true and Leibniz's objection to the argument fails, then there is no reason to reject the suitably restricted version of the Unavoidability Thesis, a version that is perfectly compatible with the Doctrine of Suspension.

The second question is whether human beings are free with respect to their particular acts of willing. Suppose I will to move my arm. Is my volition to move my arm free? According to some scholars (e.g. Chappell 1994: 108), Locke answers this question negatively too. But this, I think, is a mistake.

The argument for Locke's answer appears in the following passage:

> For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases, is to ask, whether a Man can *will*, what he *wills*; or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A Question, which, I think, needs no answer: and they, who can make a Question of it, must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate that; and so on *in infinitum*. (*Essay* II. xxi. 25: 247)

Locke says here that the question whether a man is free with respect to his volitions is the same as the question whether a man 'can *will*, what he *wills*; or be pleased with what he is pleased with'. The answer to this question is obvious, indeed *obviously in the affirmative*, for it is obvious that what is actual is possible: what a man *does* is clearly something he *can do*. Chappell supposes that Locke takes the *question* to be absurd, when it is in fact the *answer* to the question that Locke takes to be absurd. As Locke sees it, the relevant question 'needs no answer' *precisely because* the correct answer to it is *obvious*. The reason is plain. Consider whether S is free with respect to any one of his volitions (say, V). According to Locke, S is free with respect to V if and only if: S can perform V if S wills to perform V, and S can fail to perform V if S wills not to perform V. But, as Locke sees it, to will to perform V is just to perform V and to will not to perform V is just to fail to perform V. Consequently, S is free with respect to V if and only if: S can perform V if S performs V, and S can fail to perform V if S fails to perform V. It follows immediately from the principle that actuality entails possibility that agents are all free with respect to their volitions.

Locke therefore provides a (qualified) negative answer to the first question and an unqualified positive answer to the second. On his view, human beings are free to will what they actually will, both because they have the power to will and because they have the power to suspend willing. Despite the general Hobbesian tenor of his theory of the will as a power rather than an agent, Locke's endorsement of the Doctrine of Suspension shows that his views do diverge significantly from Hobbes', and converge with Bramhall's and Cudworth's, in at least one important respect. One of Locke's great intellectual achievements, then, is that he was able to cull important insights from his predecessors without thereby cobbling together an internally incoherent theory.

But Locke's theory of will and motivation is not problem-free. Like Hobbes, but unlike Bramhall and Cudworth, Locke denies that the will is self-determined. Even in the case of free, voluntary actions, one's volitions are determined by one's desires, principally desires to be rid of pain or uneasiness. Thus if a subject S wills to suspend willing, what determines her volition to suspend is a desire D_1 to be rid of pain, presumably pain at the thought of what would likely happen if she did not suspend. But now, on Locke's mature view, S has the power to suspend her prosecution of D_1: she can fail to follow D_1, precisely in order to consider whether following D_1 conduces to her happiness. But given that the will is not self-determined, it follows that what determines S's suspension of the prosecution of D_1 is another desire (call it 'D_2') to be rid of pain, presumably pain at the thought of what would likely happen if she did not suspend her prosecution of D_1. But Locke also holds that S has the power to suspend the prosecution of D_2, and hence it follows from the rest of his views that what determines S's suspension of the prosecution of D_2 is yet another desire (call it 'D_3') to be rid of pain. And thus we are led to accept the existence of an infinite regress of desires and volitions to suspend them. This infinite regress problem, one that Locke himself never considered, continues to plague Lockean accounts of the relation between volition and motivation.

17.5 Conclusion

The development of philosophical opinion on the subject of will and motivation in seventeenth-century Britain is complex but rational. The story begins with an acrimonious debate between a strong proponent of a form of incompatibilist Aristotelianism (Bramhall) and a vigorous exponent of the new scientific, compatibilist and anti-Aristotelian, mechanical philosophy (Hobbes). This debate, which frames the conversation on these topics for the next fifty years, is altered by the powerful but occasionally confused contributions of the incompatibilist and anti-Aristotelian Cambridge Platonists (such as Cudworth), and reaches its apotheosis in the work of Locke. It is a strong testament to Locke's intellectual honesty that he finds the need to craft a theory of freedom and voluntariness that borrows insights from *all* of his predecessors. This theory, though not problem-free, is remarkable in its coherent explanation of the possibility of weakness of will and its accommodation of the Doctrine of Suspension within a compatibilist, Hobbesian conception of freedom as freedom of action. Locke's theory remains a shining paradigm of generous intellectual synthesis, and in this respect deserves our everlasting admiration.

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CHAPTER 18

HEDONISM AND VIRTUE

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Virtue and pleasure have often been thought to stand in tension with each other. Not all philosophers have believed this, but many have regarded a life devoted to the pursuit of pleasure as the antithesis of a virtuous life. A virtuous person is one who is consistently motivated to pursue right actions for their own sake. The just person, for example, is disposed to act justly in her dealings with others, with such actions requiring no further motivation or justification than that they are just. One of the principal challenges to this conception of virtue is presented by the ancient philosopher Epicurus and his followers who defend the doctrine of hedonism. For Epicureans, virtue is only instrumentally valuable as a means to pleasure. The Epicureans' main ancient opponents, the Stoics, and later critics such as Cicero, found such a view unacceptable because it accorded insufficient weight to virtue. A person whose primary goal was pleasure could not be expected to give the appropriate attention to the requirements of virtue: faced with a choice between actions that demanded moderation, courage, or justice and actions that promised significant pleasure (or significantly less pain), he would inevitably choose the latter—to the detriment of virtue. Such criticisms were repeated by theologians and moralists throughout the ancient and medieval periods, and remained a stock criticism of Epicurean views in seventeenth-century Britain.

It is important at the outset to distinguish three varieties of hedonism that are often conflated. *Psychological* hedonism is a thesis about motivation. On this view,